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Introduction
The impact of political regimes on growth and public policy is an important new research area in the field of comparative politics. The initial focus was on 'democracy' versus 'autocracy' or the shift from one to the next (Barro, 1997; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) . However, the evidence that democratization per se, systematically affects growth and public policy is weak (see Persson, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2008) . 1 As a consequence scholars have shifted their attention to more specific details of democratic constitutions, like electoral rules and forms of government. For example, show that while a shift from autocracy to democracy does not have an effect on either fiscal or trade policy, there is a positive and large effect when one considers transition to parliamentary (vs. presidential) or proportional (vs. majoritarian) democracies. These results are important as they complement previous cross-country evidence about the effect of constitutional rules on public policy outcomes (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003) .
Theory predicts that proportional electoral systems and parliamentary regimes should be associated with a broad form of redistribution, like welfare programs, as well as with higher levels of government spending and redistribution, vis-à-vis majoritarian and presidential systems (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003) . A related set of comparative politics models focus on trade policy, predicting a protectionism bias in majoritarian politics (see Grossman and Helpman 2005) .
Until now, the evidence linking these constitutional features to public policy has been largely confined to macro-economic policies, like fiscal policy and trade policy. 2 Moreover, with the notable exceptions of , empirical evidence draws largely from cross-country variation. However, it is notoriously difficult 1 The recent meta-analysis of Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth. However, democracy has robust, significant, and positive indirect effects, through policies. The literature tends to be inconclusive especially when democratization episodes are considered against growth and trade policy. Differently, studies that contrast the level of democracy to different indices of economic liberalization (as in Giuliano et al. 2010) , or by using instrumental variables techniques (as in Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008) are more supportive of a positive role played by democracy. See also the recent contributions of Murtin and Wacziarg (2011) and Grosjean and Senik (2011) . 2 A few empirical studies have investigated the effect of constitutions on agricultural policy, focusing especially on democracy. Cross-country studies displayed inconclusive results (see Swinnen et al. 2000; Olper 2001) . Studies that exploit the panel dimension of the data find that democratization display a positive and robust effect on agricultural protection (see Swinnen et al. 2001; and Olper et al. 2011). 3 in comparative politics to extract causal inference from cross-sectional data (see Acemoglu, 2005) . Constitutions are themselves political outcomes and their policy effects can be confounded with that of other factors, such as cultural, historical and institutional factors, if these are not properly controlled for.
The objective of this paper is to made a contribution to the literature by addressing two main issues. First, we focus on a specific redistributive policy which is widely used in developing and developed countries, i.e. policies to tax or support farmers and food consumers. This specific policy focus is interesting because of its policy relevance and because of the availability of new policy indicators. The agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for studying the political economy of public policies. The sector is subject to heavy-handed governmental interventions throughout the world. Despite decades (even centuries) of economists' arguments against agricultural subsidies and tariffs, political factors continue to dominate agricultural policy setting (including trade policy) in both rich and poor countries. The struggle of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to conclude the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations brought again to the forefront the important role that agricultural policy continues to play in international trade relations. In poor countries, where agriculture is a very important share of the economy and where food is a major consumption item, the importance of agricultural policy as a public policy issue is obvious. However, also in rich countries agricultural policy remains disproportionately important compared to the relatively small share of agriculture in terms of economic output. For example in the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) continues to absorb 45% of the entire EU budget in 2010. Despite a strong decline of agriculture in terms of employment and output, rich countries' unwillingness to reduce agriculture subsidies threatens the WTO negotiations.
Agricultural and food policies have changed dramatically over the course of long-term economic development and continue to vary widely among countries, across commodities, and in the choice of policy instruments used. Accordingly, the evolution of policies affecting this sector and the fundamental differences among countries provides an excellent empirical foundation for studying the determinants of policy choices, and in particular of political institutions.
We make use of a new dataset on agricultural and food policy recently developed by the World Bank (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) . The public policy indicators in this new dataset cover more countries and larger period of time than it was previously available. In addition the indicators capture the effect of various public policies, including trade and fiscal policies, that affect agriculture and food consumers. Therefore, these data represent potentially an improvement compared to the standard practice of using trade openness indicators, like the Sachs and Warner (1995) index to measure trade policies (e.g. Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Milner and Kubota, 2005; Persson, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2006, among others) , 3 or other measures like score indices of agricultural policy reforms in the export sectors, as in Giuliano et al. (2010) . The new indicator measures directly the policy outcomes that we are interest in, and is likely less affected by measurement errors of subjective indicators. Second, and most important, the use of this large new dataset also allows us to include a mix of democracies and non-democracies and to measure political transition effects.
Our key empirical strategy follows the recent tendency of including democracies as well as non-democracies in the sample, to overcome the fact that established democracies do not display sufficient (time) variation in their constitutional features (Persson, 2005) .
Thus, our main source of institutional variation comes from about sixty-five democratization episodes (political reforms) in the 1960-2005 period. Exploiting these reforms, we conduct a before-after analysis to disentangle the protection growth effect of democracy per se, from that of its constitutional details, in terms of electoral rules and forms of government.
Hence, by exploiting the within-and across-country variation in constitutions and public policies, our econometric approach is less susceptible to the endogeneity concerns of this type of analysisas explained by Acemoglu (2005) . However, as a robustness check, we complement our difference-in-difference analysis with cross-sectional inference also based on instrumental variables (IV) estimator.
We find a significant positive effect of political reforms on support and redistribution toward farmers. In particular, democratic reforms into proportional democracies (vis-à-vis majoritarian) induce a clear switch from taxation to subsidization of farmers. Reforms into presidential democracies (vis-à-vis parliamentary) point in the same direction, but have less effect. Moreover, our analysis suggests that the magnitude of the institutional reform effect on agricultural protection tends to be significantly stronger for import-competing sectors and staple food crops. Finally and interesting, we find a remarkable consistency between cross-sectional and panel data inference.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section (2) summarizes recent theory and discuss the implication for agricultural and food policies. Section (3) explains how constitutional reforms are measured and classified, and gives some preliminary evidences on how agricultural protection maps across different political institutions. Section (4) introduces the econometric strategy and discusses identification issues. In Section (5) the results are presented and discussed, while Section (6) offers a battery of robustness checks. Finally, Section (7) concludes.
Main predictions and hypotheses
This paper builds on the recent political economy literature that have formalized how different forms of democracy translate to different policy outcomes. Persson and Tabellini (2004) survey the main literature. Our focus here is on electoral rules and types of government.
Forms of democracy and policy outcomes
We start with the policy effect of electoral rules. The conceptualization of electoral system typically contrast majoritarian election, with plurality rule and smaller districts, with proportional election, where the seats are attributed in proportion to votes in larger districts. The influence of electoral rules on public policy, can be both direct and indirect. 4 First, models that focus on the direct effects of electoral rules give clear predictions about the composition of government spending (see Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002) . 5 Proportional elections stimulate government programs which benefit large groups in the population (like welfare programs), while majoritarian elections give politicians a greater incentive to implement programs for geographically smaller constituency groups. This is because in proportional elections policies are more likely to reflect party preferences, often reflecting the national perspective and favouring broad forms of redistribution. Differently, in majoritarian 4 A related distinction is about 'pre-election' and 'post-election' politics. Models of 'pre-election politics' emphasizes that policy promises made during the electoral campaign have a binding impact on policymaking. Differently, in 'post-election politics' electoral promises might not be binding, and the policymaking process depends in part on bargaining among the successful parties. However, as emphasized by Scartascini and Crain (2002) , the 'pre-election' and the 'post-election' effects of electoral rules are not mutually exclusive. 5 These papers point to similar results, though they use a slight different frameworks. For example, Lizzeri and Persico (2001) study a model with binding electoral promises, where candidates can use tax revenue to provide either general public goods or targeted redistribution. Differently, consider a broad or narrow policy choice by an incumbent policymaker trying to win re-election. 6 systems individual legislators have more incentives to support the interests of the represented district, thus favouring a more narrow and geographically targeted distribution.
Second, models that studied the indirect effect of electoral rules, namely their effect mediated by the parties structure, give predictions on the size of government spending and the level of redistribution. In a model of post-election bargaining, Austen-Smith (2000) showed that government coalition of two parties spends and taxes more compared to a single-party government. Persson et al. (2007) find a similar indirect effect of electoral rules on overall spending, however they go further by treating the party structure as endogenous. 6 However, both Iversen and Soskice (2006) and Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) , provide an alternative explanation of why proportional systems spend and redistribute more, focusing on the role played by partisan governments. They argue that proportional systems are ruled relatively more by centre-left government coalitions, that are more willing to tax and redistribute income.
A third prediction is that proportional systems cause less protection in trade policy then majoritarian systems (Grossman and Helpman 2005) . This is because politicians in a majoritarian system maximize the welfare of their own districts, as opposed to the welfare of the overall country. Thus, the elected legislators will use tariffs to redistribute income to industries linked to their own districts, rather than maximize national welfare through free trade. Differently in a proportional system all regional interests will receive equal support, leading to welfare-maximizing policy of free trade. 7
Moving to the forms of government, the classical distinction is between presidential and parliamentary systems. Persson et al. (1997 and Persson and Tabellini (2000, ch. 9 ) explain how differences in the separation of power between the executive and legislative branch of government (agenda setting), as well as the degree of legislative cohesion and party discipline, affect the political incentives in presidential and parliamentary governments.
Without going in the details, main predictions show that these different forms of government will affect the level and composition of government spending in a way quite 6 Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) also find that proportional elections is associated with larger overall spending, rely on the so-called common pool problem. If different groups have partial control over some component of government, then none of them fully internalizes the fiscal costs. Clearly this problem is exacerbated under proportional elections, as this rule makes coalition governments more likely. 7 similar to the effect of electoral rules. Thus, there is lower spending and taxation in presidential regimes, than in parliamentary regimes. Moreover, presidential systems are associated with more targeted programs, like local public good, whereas parliamentary systems are associated with broader spending programs, like national public goods. 8
Implications for agricultural and food policy
What are the implications of these general predictions for the comparative politics of agricultural policy? Though the predictions are quite general and focused on macroeconomic policies, some hypotheses related to agricultural and food policy can be derived.
A first implication is related to the prediction about the direct effect of constitutional rules on the composition of government spending (narrow vs. broad). As stressed by Rausser and Roland (2010) , this prediction can take different directions depending on the nature of agricultural policy. In a rich country, considering the relative dimension of the farmers and the consumers groups, the former is typically a special interest group while the latter represents the majority of the population. Thus, because in rich countries agricultural policy takes mainly the form of income distribution to special interest, we should observe relatively more support and transfers in presidential and majoritarian systems, than in parliamentary and proportional ones, ceteris paribus. By contrast in a developing country the situation is the opposite, with farmers representing the majority of the population, while (urban) consumers act as a special interest group. Thus, agricultural policy takes mainly the form of broad income distribution, and we should observe relatively more support and transfers in parliamentary and proportional systems than in presidential and majoritarian regimes. 9
Taken together, the above considerations point to a conditional effect of electoral rules and forms of government on agricultural protection, mediated by the level of development.
Yet, if we consider the indirect effect of electoral rules on agricultural protection the implications are somewhat different. In fact, higher party fragmentation under 8 proportional electoral rule might lead to a higher frequency of parties in government representing rural interests. A consideration that points to more protection and support toward farmers in proportional (vs. majoritarian) electoral systems, irrespective of the level of development. Thus, overall, the effect of electoral rules on agricultural policy is of uncertain sign, as it depends from which of the two effects  direct vs. indirect  will prevail.
A critical aspect that need to be accounted for in the empirical analysis, is related to the extent to which the political reforms effect on agricultural policy moves toward more or less distortions and redistribution. This point is important, as governments in developing countries more often tax and do not support agriculture (see next). Our main source of variation to identify the effect of political institutions on agricultural policy come from political reforms that largely happen in developing countries. Thus, an increase in agricultural protection induced by a political reforms, could means less or more distortions and redistribution, depending on whether the main effect translate (only) toward a reduction in taxation or, differently, toward a switch from taxation to subsidization of the agricultural sector.
Data
The sample includes 74 countries, comprising yearly data from 1960 to 2005 and covering many agricultural products (see Table A .1 for countries and years coverage). Overall we worked with an unbalanced panel with more than 25,000 observations. In our estimation we used the full data set, sub-samples based on different commodity aggregations, as well as a cross-sectional sample averaged over the 1990-2004 period.
Political reforms
In classifying democratic reforms, we followed the literature (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Persson, 2005) . First, we classify countries into democracy or autocracy using the Polity2 index from the Polity IV data set (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2007) . The Polity2 index assigns a value ranging from -10 to +10 to each country and year, with higher values associated with better democracies. We code a country as democratic in each year that the Polity2 index is strictly positive, setting a binary indicator called democracy = 1 (0 otherwise). A reform into (or out of) democracy occurs in a country-year when the democracy indicator switches from 0 to 1 (and vice versa). In order to render the before-after analysis plausible it is also necessary that the policy indicator variable is available for at least two years before and after each reform episode. Applying these criteria, the dataset includes 66 political transitions, of which 41 are transition into democracy and 25 are into autocracy.
Second, following Persson (2005) , we construct four binary indicators to classify each country with respect to the specific nature of its political regime. Among democracies, countries are coded as presidential (PRES = 1 and PARL = 0) when the chief executive is not accountable to the legislature through a vote of confidence. In all other situations we have a parliamentary system (PARL = 1 and PRES = 0). 10 Moreover, countries are classified as majoritarian if election to the lower house relies strictly on plurality rule (MAJ = 1 and PROP = 0). Differently, all the other electoral systems are classified as proportional (PROP = 1 and MAJ = 0). The primary source for mapping the sample into this classification is the database of Persson and Tabellini (2003) , supplemented by the (Lundell and Karvonen, 2003) .
All the reforms are listed in Table A political reforms in permanent democracies. A few countries experienced reversal episodes during political reforms: countries that start as autocracy and then, after a democratization episode, return back to dictatorships. As brief democratization episodes may have different effects than permanent reforms, we run separate regression models using all reform episodes and only permanent reforms, as in Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Papaioannou and Siourounis, (2008) .
Dependent variables and stylized facts
We test our hypotheses using as dependent variables the 'nominal rate of assistance' to agriculture (nra) measured at the product level. The variable and the data set are from the World Bank Agdistortions Database (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) . The nra is calculated as, nra  (P  P*)/ P*, where P is the actual domestic price in local currency and P* is the estimated domestic price that would hold in the absence of any commodity-10 market or exchange-rate intervention. Thus the nra is like an equivalent tariff measuring total transfer to agricultural products (sector) as a percentage of the undistorted unit values. The nra is positive when the product is subsidized, negative when it is taxed, and 0 when net transfers are zero.
A key advantage of using the nra is related to the wide range of policies captured by this indicator. The estimates include assistance provided by tariff and non-tariff trade measures applied to agricultural products, plus any domestic price-distorting measures, as well as an adjustment for output-price equivalent of direct interventions on inputs.
Moreover, where multiple exchange rates operate, an estimate of the import or export tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well in the calculation. Thus, the nra is a more consistent index of overall support or taxation compared with previous measures used in similar exercises.
For some of the estimations we also use the aggregated nominal rate of assistance at the agricultural sector level (NRA), measured as the weighted average of the nra, using as weights the industry' value shares of each product. Working at both the agricultural and sector commodity level allows us to test whether our results are robust to potential aggregation bias, also because the weight used for aggregation, the undistorted values of production, may be measured with errors. Further, working at product level allows to investigate whether the political reform effect is heterogeneous across groups of commodities. Specifically, we will compare import-competing sectors vis-à-vis exportable sectors, as well as four different product aggregation. 11
Figures 1 and 2 compare the average nominal rate of assistance (nra) across different political regimes and commodities trade status. Figure 1 shows large differences between electoral rules. Proportional democracies have protection levels from 2 to 4 times higher than majoritarian democracies. Interestingly, these differences are increasing over time. Figure 2 shows that parliamentary democracies consistently protect agriculture more than presidential democracies, although the magnitude of these differences decreases over time. Moreover, these differences are particular strong especially for import-competing products. Table 1 , instead, reports the average level of NRA for countries that experience (permanent) reforms, averaging their values over 10 years before and after the democratization. Before democratizations, the average level of NRA of reforming countries was negative, and around -10.5%. After the reforms the NRA switches to positive, raising to +5.8%. Thus, on average, a democratization episode clearly points to a redistribution toward farmers. Interesting, there is a strong heterogeneity across forms of democracy. In fact, a relevant change in policy orientation from taxation to subsidization is apparent especially for reforms to proportional and presidential democracies.
Differently reforms to parliamentary and majoritarian democracies only appear to reduce the level of taxation.
Control variables
In the empirical specifications we include additional structural controls that are likely to affect the level of agricultural protection, as suggested by several previous studies (Anderson, 1995; Beghin, and Kherallah, 1994; Swinnen et al. 2000 Swinnen et al. , 2001 Olper, 2001 Olper, , 2007 . In particular, our basic specification always includes the following covariates: the log of real per capita GDP (lgdpc), the share of agricultural employment (empsh), the log of agricultural land per capita (landpc), the log of total population (lpop); and, in regressions run at the product level, we always include the sector value share over total agricultural production (prodsh). All these variables are computed with data from FAO, World Bank (WDI), and the Agdistortions database, or from national statistics.
To take into account that a change in political regime could be related to the occurrence of conflict (both domestic and international) we also include current and lagged indicators for years of war (war), equal to 1 (0 otherwise) if in that year(s) there has been conflict in the considered country. These data come from the UCD/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2008 (see Gleditsch et al. 2002) .
In cross-sectional regressions, following Persson and Tabellini (2003) we use two different set of variables as instruments for MAJ and PRES. First, three dummies dating the origin of the current constitution (con2150, con5150, and con81) and the age of democracy (age). Second, measures for the cultural influence of the West and Great Britain, proxy by the distance from the equator (lat01), the fraction of the country's population whose mother tongue in English (engfrac) or a European language (eurfrac) and a dummy for UK colonies (col_uka). For the majority of the countries in our sample (59), these variables come from the original data set of Persson and Tabellini (2003) .
Differently, for the remaining countries (15) we have measured the same variables following strictly their online data appendix. 12 We also include land Gini inequality (landGini) and government ideology (leftorientation), to check the robustness of our findings. Land inequality (circa 1980) is based on FAO data, and comes from Deininger and Olinto (2000) . Government ideology is based on the World Bank DPI dataset, following Dutt and Mitra (2005) and Olper (2007) .
Specifically, starting from the DPI dataset we build an ideology index by attributing a score of 1, 2 and 3 to right, centre and left-wing government, respectively. Then the index is averaged over the time span covered by each country, which normally refers to the 1975-2005 period.
Econometric approach and identification
The existing literature studying the effect of political institutions on policy outcomes has exploited especially cross-country variation in the data. The well known problem with this method is that the estimated correlation could reflect an omitted variable bias or reverse causation. In theory, a potential solution to this problem is to find good instruments and run two-stage least squares regressions. However, this strategy is problematic in our context because good instruments for regime changes are not easily available (Persson and Tabellini 2008) . Most importantly, though, cross-country regressions leave out important information from the time variation in the data, as recently suggested by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) . Thus, following recent tendencies in comparative politics literature we estimate the average effect of constitutions on policy outcomes relying primarily on difference-in-difference regressions, and leaving cross-sectional inference as robustness check.
Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we define political reforms in specific constitutional status as a 'treatment' experienced by some countries but not others. Then we estimate the average treatment effect through a difference-in-differences regression, exploiting the fact that any democratic transition (political reform) can be characterized on the basis of its specific constitutional feature in terms of electoral rules and forms of government.
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Following this strategy, we exploit both the time series and the cross-sectional variation in the data, as well as the (potential) heterogeneous effect of democratization across different constitutional rules and agricultural sectors (see below). Indeed, in our sample we include countries that experience changes in their constitution in the observed period, called the treated, as well as countries that do not experience any constitutional transition, called the controls.
In our specific context we are interested in the (possible) heterogeneous effects induced by political reforms in different constitutional features. For this reason we implement a difference-in-differences approach using a multiple treatments specification (see Persson, 2005) . Thus, our regression model can be expressed as follows The difference-in-differences estimator (1) addresses many limitations of standard cross-section regressions. For example, it accounts for time-invariant country characteristics such as geography, resource endowments and historical events, as well as for many 'structural' determinants of protection, such as comparative advantage and lobby structure, which typically move slowly over time. Moreover, the model also controls for common global shocks, removing the effect on protection of cyclical fluctuations in world prices.
However, the identification of the political reform effect from equation (1) is based on two key assumptions (see Abadie, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2008) . First, in the absence of any political reform, the average growth rate in protection in treated countries should be the same as in control countries. This assumption can be problematic in our context as the protection dynamic between developing and developed countries, has been quite different, at least this was the case since the mid-eighties. 13 We tackled this potential source of bias by adding several covariates in the vector X, with the aim of increasing the 'similarity' between treated and control countries.
Moreover, as the identifying assumption may be violated if political reforms are not random, we follow the common practice of including, in the vector X, interactions between year fixed effects and time invariant continental dummies. The continent-year interaction effects control also for differences in regional protection dynamics.
The second key restriction is that equation (1) does not take into account the (potential) heterogeneity of reform effects on agricultural protection. In this case the
the country-specific effect of political regime in country i and year t (see Ashenfelter and Card 1985) . However, because one of the objectives of our empircal exercise is to understand the potential heterogeneous effect of different constitutional features, as well as of different agricultural sectors, our approach should be quite immune to this potential source of bias. Table 2 reports regression results based on equation (1). In these regressions the dependent variable is the NRA (total support in agriculture). All the covariates discussed in Section (3) are included in the vector of controls X it . Moreover, as agricultural protection is highly persistent, the reported standard errors are clustered at country level (see Bertrand et al. 2004) .
Regression results
Columns 1 and 2 replicate earlier evidence reported in Olper et al. (2011) , who studied the political reforms effect of transitions from autocracy to democracy on agricultural protection. These regressions represent our benchmark to evaluate the effect of different constitutional rules on agricultural protection. Regression 1 yields an estimate of the democracy coefficient that is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05). The magnitude of the effect suggests that a transition from autocracy to democracy increases agricultural protection, on average, by 7.8 percent points, a relevant effect from an economic point of view. Considering only permanent reforms, namely those reforms that are not reversed in our sample period, the estimated reform effect increases to 11.7 percent points, suggesting that democracy needs time to display its effect on agricultural policy. The above results
highlight that democracy appear to be friendly of the agricultural sector, giving broad confirmation to the findings of Olper et al. (2011) .
To disentangle the effect of constitutional rules, in the subsequent regressions of Table   4 , the relevant variables are obtained by interacting the democracy dummy with the dummies for government systems, PARL and PRES (columns 3-4) and electoral rules, PROP and MAJ (columns 5-6). Considering first the forms of government, regression results suggest that a reform from autocracy to a presidential democracy induces an increase in agricultural protection of about 8.8 percent points, a magnitude that goes up to 14 percent points if only permanent reforms are considered. These effects are statistically significantly at the 5% level. Differently, a political reform from autocracy to a parliamentary democracy induces an increase in protection, which is still positive (about 4-5% points) but never significant at conventional statistical level. Thus, it appears that presidential democracies tend to support agriculture more than parliamentary democracies, ceteris paribus. However, performing an F-test to check their statistical difference, we cannot reject the equality of the two coefficients at the conventional statistical level. Thus, the magnitude of the effect of transitions from autocracy to presidential democracy, although positive and significant, is not statistically different from transition to parliamentary democracies, namely having a presidential or a parliamentary system does not seem to matter for agricultural policy.
Regressions in columns 5 and 6 display the results when the democratization effect is split with respect to electoral rules, thus considering political reforms from autocracy to a proportional or a majoritarian democracy. As it is clear from the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on PROP and MAJ, differences in electoral rules matter a lot for agricultural protection. A country that experiences a reform to proportional democracy, from an autocratic status or from a majoritarian democracy, increases agricultural protection by about 15-17% points, and the effect is precisely estimated (p-value < 0.01).
Differently, reforms from autocracy to a majoritarian democracy has an effect of about 2.5-5%, never statistically significant. Not surprising, the F-test for the equality of the coefficients on proportional and majoritarian indicators, is rejected at the 5% statistical level.
Summarizing, the two sets of results suggest interesting constitutional effects on agricultural protection. Specifically, a political reform from autocracy to a proportional democracy increase agricultural support or, differently, reduce the level of agricultural taxation, of about 17% points, whereas transition to majoritarian democracy does not. For transition to presidential democracies (vis-à-vis parliamentary) the evidence points in the same direction, although the estimated effect is lower in magnitude, and less robust. As the majority of countries experiencing democratic reforms have a negative agricultural protection before the transition, so they tax agriculture, but after the transition they switch to protecting it (see Table 1 ), then we have a clear indication that certainly a reform to proportional democracy and, to a lesser extent, a reform to presidential democracy increases redistribution toward farmers.
The regressions above are based on average NRA obtained by aggregating the level of protection across many agricultural commodities. This can rise potential aggregation bias.
Thus, it is important to evaluate whether our results are robust to this issue, working also at the commodities level. This allows us to investigate the existence of possible heterogeneity in the constitutional policy effect across different groups of commodities.
Indeed, as shown by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), there exists a huge variation in sectoral protection levels.
A classical distinction in agriculture is between import-competing (Table 2) and export sectors (Table 3) , the former traditionally more protected than the latter (see Krueger, 1990; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007) . 14 In these additional regressions, the usable observations increase substantially. The specification now includes also countryproduct fixed effects, as well as each product value share on total agricultural production, to control for heterogeneity at the sectoral level. 15
Regressions at the product level broadly confirm the previous evidence, giving also new interesting insights. 16 First, a political reform toward democracy always increases agricultural protection, although the magnitude of the estimated effect is sector specific: it reaches about 17.4% points for import-competing sectors (see Table 3 ) but it is only 6.8% points for export sectors (see Table 4 ). Across forms of government, what matters is again transitions to presidential (vs. parliamentary) democracy. Differently across electoral rules only transition to proportional (vs. majoritarian) democracy significantly increases agricultural protection. Once again the estimated coefficients of different electoral rules are always statistically different from each other, while across government systems they are not. What is interesting from these additional results is the huge difference in the estimated effect between import-competing vs. export sectors. For import-competing sectors, a transition to presidential and proportional democracy, increases agricultural protection by about 22-23% points, whereas the effect is never higher than 10% points for export sectors. However, all these effects are precisely estimated only, or especially, in the grains-tubers sector that represent typical staple food crops.
Robustness checks and extensions
Our specification is more elaborate than previous similar studies of agricultural protection.
Indeed, other than the key determinants found relevant in other studies, we also control for time invariant country-sector heterogeneity, unobserved common shocks, differences in continental trends in protection, and political crises. Furthermore, we performed a series of additional robustness checks adding to our specification measures of contemporaneous and lagged economic crisis (see Giuliano et al., 2010) ; measures of government policy, like government consumption to GDP and trade openness (based on both trade over GDP and the Sachs-Warner openness index), as well as other agricultural specific controls, like the net export share. While some of these controls turn out to be significant in same regressions, they never change the quantitative and qualitative nature of the results. 17
Dynamic panel model
A potential critique on the results is that they are based on a static model, while agricultural protection is highly persistent over time due to inertia and status quo bias.
This forces all the dynamics to be captured either by the included controls or by the time dummies. Since several controls included in the vector X it exhibit limited time variation, we attribute a large fraction of the dynamics in protection to unobserved common events, and this is particularly true for regressions based on sectoral nra.
To allow for such persistency, Table 6 presents a dynamic version of equation (1), estimating autoregressive specifications that control for persistence in agricultural protection. Note that although the joint presence of fixed effects and the lagged dependent In fact we find a significant positive effect on protection of a democratization episode of about 3.8% points. This effect changes only slightly for transitions to presidential democracy (4% points), but increases significantly to 6.2% points on passing to proportional democratic transitions. 19 At the same time, presidential and parliamentary coefficients are never statistically different form each other, while these differences persist when considering electoral rules. Finally, once again the import-competing sectors display 17 These additional results are available from the authors upon request. 18 Running regressions excluding the few countries with less than 20 years observations, as in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) , or using System Generalized Method of Moment estimator, the results are even stronger. These additional results are available from the authors upon request. 19 Note that, these numbers are short-run effects. If we retrieve the long-run political reform effectsnamely the short-run coefficient divided by one minus the lagged dependent variable coefficientthen their magnitude are closed to the static models: i.e. the (short-run) democratization effect of 3.8% points reported in column 1 of Table 6 , correspond to a long-run effect of 12.2% points, thus just a little higher to the 11.7% points of the static model reported in column 2 of Table 2. higher sensitivity to institutionally induced policy changes, and the same pattern emerges considering the four sector groups (results not shown).
Cross-sectional inference and IV regressions
As a final check of our results we now move to cross-sectional regressions. Previous evidence based on difference-in-differences estimator offer more credible inference about the causal effect of political institutions on agricultural policy. However, a potential critique to our findings is related to the consideration that constitutions are endogenous (see Aghion et al. 2004; Acemoglu, 2005; Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010) . As discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2003) , it seems reasonable to assume that the endogeneity issues of electoral rules and forms of government on policy outcomes are mainly due to problems of selection bias. However, we cannot rule out a priori that the results are in fact also driven by simultaneity bias. This point has been clearly stated by Ticchi and Vindigni (2010, p. 1) 'if different constitutional provisions lead to different fiscal policies and, therefore, generate different benefits for the various groups in the society, we should expect individuals to have different preferences over constitutions and take this into account at the time of the constitutional choice'.
To account for simultaneity problems we move to cross-sectional inference, averaging the level of protection across fifteen years (from 1990 to 2004) and running IV regressions. Instruments for the forms of government indicators (MAJ and PRES) came from Persson and Tabellini (2003) , the only difference been in the first stage regression where we include also all the right hand-side variable of the second stage. 20 suggesting that OLS regression is the correct estimator.
As a final check of our results we consider the potential effect of two further exogenous variables founded relevant in previous studies (Olper, 2007) : inequality and government ideology. Indeed, though the overidentification test suggests that our results
should be robust to one or more (excluded) exogenous variables, it is also well know that this test might have low power.
Consider first inequality. Countries with a more equal distribution of assets, in particular land for agricultural issues, may be more likely to make transitions to proportional democracy that, as discussed in Section 2, should better preserve an egalitarian distribution of income. If this is the case, then the higher redistributive nature of proportional democracy could simply be the result of a more effective agricultural coalition, such as an effect of the lower heterogeneity in the agricultural group (see La Ferrara, 2002; Olper 2007) .
Second, there is evidence that left-wing governments are more likely in a proportional democracy (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010) . In such a situation, the risk is that we are confounding the redistributive effect of proportional democracy with those of a left-wing government. 22 Thus, Columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 , include both the land Gini and the left-orientation variables in our baseline OLS specification. The electoral rule effect is totally unaffected by the inclusion of these additional controls. In columns 7 and 8 we test a specification that includes also an interaction effect between land Gini and government ideology, as a left-wing government could have a strong rationale for redistribution in an unequal society, potentially affecting the ideologyprotection relationship (see Olper, 2007) . The results support the above hypothesis: the interaction term is positive and significant and, at the same time, the (absolute) linear coefficients of both land Gini and the ideology variables increase in magnitude, and are now significant at 5% or 10% level. However, most relevant for our purpose, is the fact that the estimated effect of electoral rule is only slightly affected by this modification, and retains its significant level.
Summing up, these additional regressions show that our main results are robust to the use of IV regressions and that the electoral rules effect on public policies is not driven by the partisan orientation of governments.
Discussion and conclusions
The results presented above point to a robust positive effect of proportional electoral rule on agricultural protection and support, an effect that is particular strong for importcompeting sectors and staple food crops. A similar positive effect is detected for presidential countries, although in that case the effect is smaller in magnitude and less robust. The key question is now how can we interpret these results in the light of the political economy predictions summarized in Section 2.
Existing theory on the direct effect of electoral rules on the composition of government spending, when applied to agricultural policy, suggests that proportional democracies (vis-à-vis majoritarian ones) should have larger transfers and redistribution toward farmers, when this group represents the majority of the population. According, our difference-in-differences estimates show that reforms to proportional democracy increases protection, on average, by about 17% points, an effect consistent with the idea that 22 The two hypotheses find some support in the data. Specifically, running a Probit regression where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for majoritarian countries (0 otherwise), on the land Gini coefficient and the level of development, we find that inequality, indeed, increases weakly the probability of having a majoritarian electoral system, at least in OECD countries. Similarly, if we regress our indicator of left-wing orientation on the majoritarian dummy, controlling for the level of development, we find that countries with proportional electoral rules have a higher frequency of left-wing government, although this effect is never statistically significant.
22
proportional systems tend to redistribute toward farmers. This result is consistent with our hypothesis about the electoral rules effect on the composition of government spending (broad vs. narrow). Indeed in our context, redistribution towards agriculture has to be considered a broad form of redistribution, as countries undergoing democratic transition have an average share of agricultural population higher than 50%. However, at the same time, our results on electoral rules are contrary to the Grossman and Helpman (2005) model who predicts a protectionism bias in majoritarian democracies: for the agricultural sector we find exactly the opposite.
The findings about the effect of forms of government are less clear. Indeed, theory predicts that presidential countries should have lower government spending, and smaller transfers to broad population groups. Econometric evidence shows that agricultural protection tends to increase more after transitions to presidential democracies, although this effect is sometimes weak and not confirmed by cross-sectional regressions. From this point of view, given the structure of our reforming countries, our econometric evidence tends to be contrary to theory. 23
Our analysis also suggests that the magnitude of the constitutional effects on agricultural protection tends to be 'sector' specific, with import-competing sectors and staple food crops being significantly more sensitive to institutionally induced policy changes. We do not have theoretical priors to interpret this evidence. However, if farmers producing for import-competing sectors and/or staple food crops are more numerous, and have incomes close to the median or, differently, are more able to form effective coalitions because losers tend to lobby harder, then it is not surprising to find that, after a democratization process, their weight in the government objective function increase.
A final outcome of our results is related to the channel through which electoral rules exert its effect on agricultural policy. A first result suggests that neither inequality, nor government ideology, is at the root of the agricultural protectionism bias of proportional democracies. However, it is important to note that our cross-sectional evidence is consistent with prediction about the indirect effect of electoral rules. Thus, on the one hand the difference-in-differences evidence supports the prediction about the compositions of government spending. On the other hand, from the cross-sectional inference one can argue that indirect political incentive effects appear the most plausible 23 interpretation of our findings, ceteris paribus. Thus, how can we interpret this apparent puzzle results? In our view there are two possible interpretations.
First, as emphasized by Scartascini and Crain (2001) , for 'pre-election' and the 'postelection' effects of electoral rules, the direct effect on the composition of public spending, and the indirect effect on the overall level of spending, are not mutually exclusive.
A second interpretation is linked to how agricultural sector, and the related policy, should be considered in modern democracies. Indeed, one can argue that the popular view that sees agriculture as a typical 'narrow' special interest group in rich countries, could be substituted by a view that sees the sector as a 'broad' interest for the population. This view fits with the idea that agricultural protection persists also because the population at large, and thus government, tends to give high national priority to food security related issues.
Future investigations of this idea appear important to better understand the extent to which actual comparative politics models are able to explain patterns of agricultural protection. Difference-in-difference estimates Notes: P-value based on robust standard errors clustered by country-sector in parentheses. All regressions include: the log of per-capita GDP, the log of population, agricultural employment share, land per capita, the product value shares, conflict year dummies, and interaction between years and continent dummies (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). Figures in bold (italics) when the significant level is higher than 95% (90%). Notes: P-value based on robust standard errors clustered by country-sector in parentheses. All regressions include: the log of per-capita GDP, the log of population, agricultural employment share, land per capita, the product value shares, conflict year dummies, and interaction between years and continent dummies (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). Figures in bold (italics) when the significant level is higher than 95% (90%). All sectors Import-competing Exportables Notes: P-value based on robust standard errors clustered by country-sector in parentheses. All regressions include: the log of per-capita GDP, the log of population, agricultural employment share, land per capita, the product value shares, conflict year dummies, and interaction between years and continent dummies (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). Figures in bold (italics) when the significant level is higher than 95% (90%). Notes: p-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses; controls always included in every regression: lgdpc, empsh, landpc, lpop plus Africa, Asia, Latin American and OECD regional dummies. First stage specification of 2SLS (columns 3-4) includes: all second stage controls plus con2150, con5180, con81, age, engfrac, eurfrac, lat01 and col_uka (see text). Left-orientation is equal to 1, 2 and 3 for countries with right, center and left-wing government ideology, respectively (see text). Samples: Broad include all country with data; Narrow, considers country with Polity2>5. Chi2 Over-id. reports the Sargan's test statistic for overidentifying restriction, with Ho testing whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the equation is misspecified. Chi2 endogeneity reports the Wooldridge's score test, with Ho testing whether MAJ and PRES are exogenous. Figures in bold (italics) when the significant level is higher than 95% (90%). 
